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COMMENTS
FEDERAL TAXATION-TAX ASPECTS OF CORPORATE BUY AND
SELL AGREEMENTS-One of the major problems faced by a closelyheld corporation is that of providing for the orderly continuation
of the corporation on the death of one of its shareholders. A
common solution to the problem is the utilization of a buy and sell
agreement in the form of either a stock purchase or cross purchase
agreement. A stock purchase agreement, often called a stock redemption agreement, provides that the corporation will buy the
deceased shareholder's stock upon his death. 1 A cross purchase
agreement provides that a surviving shareholder,2 as distinguished
from the corporation, will buy the decedent's interest on his
death. The funds for either type of purchase agreement can come
from cash accumulated by the survivor or the corporation, but
the most common source is the proceeds of a life insurance policy.3
Since the method of financing is fairly unimportant to this discussion,4 it will be assumed that the agreements are funded by
insurance. If a different result would follow in a particular instance by financing through the accumulation of cash, specific
reference will be made to that difference.
It is the purpose of this comment to consider the tax problems
connected with both types of "conventional" corporate buy and
sell agreements.5 It should be recognized, however, that there are

1 Agreements of this sort have also been referred to as stock redemption agreements
or survivor purchase agreements, but will be referred to herein solely as stock purchase
agreements. Deceased shareholder will be used to xefer to the party to the agreement who
dies first.
2 Surviving shareholder or survivor will be used herein to refer to the shareholder
to the agreement who survives.
a If a cross purchase agreement is used, each shareholder will purchase insurance
on the life of the other shareholders and will name himself as beneficiary. Other methods,
such as the purchase of insurance on one's own life with oneself as beneficiary and a
provision in the agreement for the share to transfer automatically to the survivor, can
be used but are dangerous. See part I-B-4 infra. If a stock purchase agreement is used,
only one policy need be purchased by the corporation on the life of each shareholder
and the corporation will name itself as beneficiary.
4 Most of the problems discussed will apply to ·both methods of financing.
5 "Conventional" is used here to mean a properly executed agreement with all of
the necessary provisions. This agreement will be compared with the improperly drafted
agreements that are presented by the cases. See Jones and Gleason, "Casale Reversed:
Corporate Insurance Not Dividend to Controlling Stockholder," 7 J. TAXATION 258 at 262
(1957); Mannheimer and Friedman, "Stock-Retirement Agreements-The Prunier and
Sanders Cases," 35 TAXES 567 (1957). Many_ of the problems of corporate -buy and sell
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many questions of local law and business necessity that also exert
influence on the use of such agreements.6
I.

STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENTS

A. Operation of the Agreement Before the Death of One of the
Parties
I. Income Tax Liability of the Shareholders for Premium
Payments. When insurance is used to finance a stock purchase
agreement, there is a possibility that the payment of premiums
by the corporation will be considered a constructive dividend
to the shareholders.7 Yet three recent cases, Casale v. Commissioner,8 Sanders v. Fox,9 and Prunier v. Commissioner,1° have
considerably lessened this possibility. These cases make it fairly
clear that the insurance premium will not be considered a dividend
to the shareholders11 if the corporation retains any property interest in the policy,12 whether it is legal or equitable in nature. The
agreements apply equally to partnership buy and sell agreements. Generally see Samuels,
"Funding Partnership Buy-and-Sell Agreements with Life Insurance," 35 TAXES 857 (1957);
comment, 71 HARV. L. REv. 687 at 697 (1958); Willis and Fortser, "Partnership Buy-andSell Agreements," 96 TRUSTS AND EsrATES 337 (1957).
6 Local law problems include restrictions on redemptions from surplus, validity of
restrictions on the alienation of stock, illusory agreements, testamentary intent, insurable
interest and validity of option agreements. See O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of
Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting," 65 HARV. L. REv. 773 (1952);
comment, 71 HARv. L. REv. 687 at 711 (1958). The shareholders should analyze the facts
of their individual situation to see if a buy and sell agreement is the best means of continuing the corporation on death. Option agreements, inter vivos gifts or inter vivos
sale may be proper alternatives in some situations.
7 Constructive dividends are dividends that were not actually received, but since the
shareholder benefits from the distribution it is treated as if he actually received the
payment. See Paramount-Richards Theatres v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d)
602.
8 (2d Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 440, revg. 26 T.C. 1020 (1956).
9 (10th Cir. 1958) 253 F. (2d) 855, revg. (D.C. Utah 1957) 149 F. Supp. 942.
10 (1st Cir. 1957) 248 F. (2d) 818, revg. 28 T.C. 19 (1957).
11 Several earlier cases involving insurance, though not a stock purchase agreement,
used this principle. George Matthew Adams, 18 B.T.A. 381 (1929); N. Loring Danforth,
18 B.T.A. 1221 (1930); Lawthers, "Prunier Offers No Threat to a Sound Buyout Plan,"
7 J. TAXATION 2 (1957). However, some cases involving insurance have held the premiums
taxable to the corporation even where the corporation has retained a property interest.
Paramount-Richards Theatres v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 602. There may
be a distinction between standard insurance and insurance for a stock purchase agreement when the beneficiary is the shareholder because a stock purchase agreement ties
the insurance closer to the corporation.
12 The reason for this is that the stock purchase agreement may never reach fruition
and the shareholder would have been taxed for nothing. MacNeill, "Disposition of Business
Interests," 87 TRUSTS AND EsrATES 398 at 403 (1918); Mannheimer and Friedman, "StockRetirement Agreements-The Prunier and Sanders Cases," 35 TAXES 567 (1957).
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decisions are based on the distinction drawn between a shareholder
and his corporation. 13 Using the corporate entity theory, these
cases rejected the argument that the premiums are constructive
dividends merely because the shareholders benefit from the insurance policies.14
It appears that the shareholders can own the policies, select
the beneficiaries and still avoid dividend treatment if they give
the corporation some slight property interest. There is a warning
in each of these cases, however, of possible constructive dividend
treatment if the corporation's property interest becomes nonexistent. For maximum safety and to avoid possible litigation,
the best procedure would be to designate the corporation as owner
and beneficiary of the insurance policies used to finance a stock
purchase agreement.
2. Income Tax Deduction to the Corporation for Premium
Payments. When life insurance is used by the corporation to
finance a stock purchase agreement, the premiums are clearly not
deductible as compensation to employees when the corporation
is either directly or indirectly a beneficiary of the policy.15 Since
the corporation should retain some interest in the insurance if
the stockholder is to avoid constructive dividend treatment, the
corporation would be either a direct or indirect beneficiary, and
lose any possible deduction.
3. Improper Accumulations of Surplus. Accumulations of
surplus to fund a stock purchase agreement, represented by liquid
assets or the cash surrender value of an insurance policy, niay subject the corporation to the accumulated earnings tax imposed by
sections 531-537.16 The tax will be imposed only when there is
an accumulation "for the purpose of avoiding the income tax
with respect to its shareholders."17 But the intent to avoid income
taxes will be presumed when there is an accumulation "beyond

13 I.R.C., §§1, 11.
14 The shareholder

clearly benefits under these agreements from such things as an
assured market for his stock, a definite fund with which to redeem the stock, and an
assured minimum price. Lawthers, "Prunier Offers No Threat to a Sound Insured Buyout
Plan," 7 J. TAXATION 2 at 5 (1957); Sanders v. Fox, (D.C. Utah 1957) 149 F. Supp. 942.
15 I.R.C., §264(a)(I); Merrimac Hat Corp., 29 B.T.A. 690 (1934).
16 I.R.C., §§531-537. For a general explanation of this tax, see Cary, "Accumulations
Beyond the Reasonable Needs of the Business: The Dilemma of Section 102(c)," 60 HARv.
L. REV. 1282 (1949); Barker, "Penalty Tax on Corporations Improperly Accumulating
Surplus," 35 TAXES 949 (1957).
17 I.R.C., §532(a).
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the reasonable needs of the business,"18 unless the corporation can
prove a contrary intent "by the preponderance of the evidence.''19
Since proving a contrary intent is extremely difficult, this presumption is highly significant.20
It is generally felt that the penalty tax should not be applied
to funds used to finance a stock purchase agreement because such
accumulations are clearly for a business purpose and are not for
the purpose of avoiding the income tax on shareholders. The
recently decided case of Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner,21 however, casts some doubt upon this conclusion.22 In the
Pelton case owners of 80 percent of the corporate stock devised a
plan whereby the corporation would, following a recapitalization,
purchase their entire common stock and half of their preferred
stock interests for roughly $800,000; in this manner the minority
common stockholder would be permitted to obtain complete
control of the corporation. To finance the plan the corporation
borrowed $500,000 and retained earnings during the taxable year
of $209,731. It was on this accumulation that the penalty tax was
imposed. The Tax Court, which was -affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, reasoned that "where a closely
held corporation adopts some plan (even having as its purpose
the satisfaction of an otherwise bona fide business need)" by
which its stockholders save substantial income taxes,23 and "but
for this tax saving, the same result could have been accom1s I.R.C., §533(a). Reasonably anticipated needs is included in the term reasonable
needs of the business. I.R.C., §537.
19 For a case where there was an unreasonable accumulation but where there was
no intent to avoid the tax, see Gus Blass Co., 9 T.C. 15 at 37 (1947). Further discussion
of burden of proof can be found in Kopperud and Donaldson, "The Burden of Proof
in Accumulated Surplus Cases," 35 TAXES 827 (1957).
20 If an unreasonable accumulation cannot be established, usually most courts will
be reluctant to find an intent to avoid the income tax on the shareholders. But see
Whitney Chain &: Mfg. Co., 3 T.C. 1109 (1944), affd. per curiam (2d Cir. 1945) 149 F.
(2d) 936.
21 28 T.C. 153 (1957), affd. (7th Cir. 1958) 251 F. (2d) 278.
22 There is no danger if the accumulated earnings and profits are below $100,000
because §535(c) was amended to provide that no accumulated earnings ta.x will be applied
to the first $100,000 accumulated. It is doubtful if the accumulated earnings tax would
apply to a corporation where substantial dividends were declared each year or where
the shareholders were in a low income tax bracket because an intent to avoid taxation on
the shareholders could not be established. Mannheimer, "Insurance to Fund StockRetirement and Buy-and-Sell Agreements," 9 N.Y.U. INsr. ON FED. TAX. 77 at 96 (1951).
The tax would clearly not apply to a publicly owned corporation because the intent to
avoid the tax on a large number of shareholders could not be shown.
23 The approximate amount of savings was $70,000. See Pelton Steel Casting Co. v.
Commissioner, 28 T.C. 153 at 172 (1957).
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plished
with the declaration and payment of a dividend,"
it is probable that there is an intent to avoid taxes within the
meaning of section 531.24
While this broad language appears applicable to stock purchase agreements of the type here under consideration, it can be
argued that this reasoning will not extend to such agreements
since they are essentially different from the transaction involved
in the Pelton case. The Pelton case involved in substance an
immediate transfer from the majority to the minority shareholder
in a form dictated by tax avoidance. The majority shareholders
set the price at which the corporation would redeem their shares.
On the other hand a stock purchase agreement is a freely negotiated agreement to provide for the orderly redemption at some
future time of a shareholder's interest at a price which reflects
the true value of the corporation.
There is a further distinction in that, while the agreement
in the Pelton case had the effect of injuring the corporation by
reducing its immediate working capital by 60 percent and imposing a new $500,000 obligation, a stock purchase agreement
does in fact benefit the corporation. The benefits from such an
agreement would include continuity of management, encouragement of creditors, improvement of employee morale, and avoidance of inexperienced ownership.25 When life insurance is used
to finance the stock purchase agreement, the corp9ration often
derives the added benefit of financial protection against the loss
received by the death of key employees.26 If these distinctions
are accepted, the reasoning of the Pelton case should not be
extended to stock purchase agreements. That the Tax Court did
not intend the language in its decision of that case to extend

24 Id. at 174. See Sorden, "CA-7 Opinion in Pelton Steel Clouds Rules on Surplus
Accumulation, Redemption," 8 J. TAXATION 254 (1958).
25 Prunier v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1957) 248 F. (2d) 818; Emeloid Co. v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 230; Edgar M. Docherly, 47 B.T.A. 462 (1942); Fred
F. Fisher, 6 CCH T.C.M. 520 (1947). Mannheimer and Friedman, "Stock-Retirement
Agreements," 28 TAXES 423 (1950); Kimbrough, "Buy-Sell Agreements," 97 TRUSTS AND
ESTATES 925 (1958).
20 This is only of minor significance if it is remembered that the proceeds will be
paid out on death for the decedent's stock and will not be used by the corporation. For
cases involving key man insurance, see General Smelting Co., 4 T.C. 313 (1944); Bradford•
Robinson Printing Co. v. United States, 58-1 U.S.T.C. U9262 (1957). Some argue that the
tax should not be imposed when insurance is involved. Sneed, "A Defense of the Tax
Court's Result in Prunier and Sanders," 43 CORN. L.Q. 339 at 373 (1958); Larkin, "Survivor
Purchase Agreements and Taxes," 97 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 881 (1958).
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beyond the factual situation presented is illustrated by the fact that
two similar cases were stated by the court to be inapplicable on
the ground that a clear business purpose had existed in both.27
There is also a recent case,28 involving a 5-0 percent redemption,
in which the court did not apply the Pelton test. Instead of looking
only to see if the transaction could have been accomplished by a
dividend and disregarding any business purpose, the court scrutinized the redemption to determine whether it was for a reasonable business purpose.
If it is accepted that a stock purchase agreement has a reasonable business purpose, which seems fairly clear, an accumulation
of earnings and profits to effectuate the agreement would not be
presumed to be for the purpose of avoiding income tax on shareholders. In seeking to invoke the penalty tax, however, the
government could still rely on the argument made in the Pelton
case that an intent to avoid the income tax is present if the "same
result could have been accomplished ... with the declaration and
payment of a dividend." In the Pelton case, as indicated, the court
was of the opinion that the redemption of the 80 percent interest
could have as easily been effectuated through a dividend payment
as through the accumulation of earnings, since dividend payments
would reduce the value of the shareholders' interests in the
corporation and correspondingly less cash would be needed to
redeem their stock at the designated time. Yet it would seem
doubtful that the "same result" could be accomplished when a
50 percent stock interest is to be redeemed. The difference might
best be illustrated by an example. Assume a corporation worth
$400,000, with $350,000 earnings and profits. The value of an
80 percent interest in this corporation is $320,000. A straight
cash redemption would cost the corporation $320,000, and leave
it with $30,000 earnings and profits. If the corporation paid a
dividend of $100,000, the value of the 80 percent interest would

27 Dill Mfg. Co., 39 B.T.A. 1023 (1939); Gazette Publishing Co. v. Self, (D.C. Ark.
1952) 103 F. Supp. 779.
28 Penn. Needle Co., 17 CCH T.C.M. 504 (1958). Other cases where a reasonable
business purpose was successfully argued: Hedberg-Freidheim Contracting Co., 15 CCH
T.C.M. 1433 (1956); Fred F. Fisher, 6 CCH T.C.M. 520 (1947); W. H. Gunlocke Chair
Co., 2 CCH T.C.M. 885 (1943). Cases where a reasonable business purpose was argued
but the court held against the taxpayer: Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U.S.
693 (1943); Trico Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 346 (1942), affd. (2d Cir
1943) 137 F, (2d) 424. For a review of other cases in this area, see Altman, "Corporate
Accumulation of Earnings," 36 TAXES 933 (1958).
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be reduced to $240,000, but the shareholder would have received
$80,000 in dividends. A redemption for $240,000 would then
leave the corporation with $10,000 earnings and profits. Thus
the difference to the corporation under the alternative plans is
only $20,000 in earnings and profits. In the case of a 50 percent
redemption, the corporation without paying a dividend would
have to spend $200,000 to redeem the interest, and would be left
with $150,000 earnings and profits. If a dividend of $100,000 were
paid, the corporation could subsequently redeem the 50 percent
interest for $150,000. This would leave $100,000 in earnings and
profits. Here the corporation's earnings and profits have been
reduced to the extent of $50,000 in excess of what would have
been needed for a straight cash redemption. The government,
therefore, might find it quite difficult when a 50 percent redemption is involved, to argue that the "same result" could have been
accomplished by the payment of a dividend. Since the courts
were not disturbed by the 80-20 ownership ratio in the Pelton
case, however, future cases in this area must be closely observed.
B. Operation of the Agreement on the Death
of One of the Parties

I. Redemption Proceeds as Dividends to the Estate. On the
death of one of the parties to a stock purchase agreement, the
decedent's estate surrenders its shares to the corporation for a
predetermined price. The treatment of this transaction is governed
by the redemption provision in section 302.29 The question raised
by this section is whether the redemption will be treated as a
sale or exchange of stock, or as a dividend. If it is treated as a sale
or exchange, the gain is measured by the difference between the
fair market value at the decedent's death (the basis of the stock
in the hands of the estate) and the amount realized from the
redemption.80 Normally, however, if the sale or exchange is pursuant to a conventional stock purchase agreement, there will be
no difference between the amount realized from the redemption

29 I.R.C., §302. See generally Rasman, "Stock Redemptions," 35 TAXES 355 (1957);
Roeder, "Distributions in Redemption of Stock," 15 N.Y.U. INsr. ON FED. TAX. 475 (1957);
Waldo, "Liquidating a Shareholder's Interest in a Closely Held Corporation," 28 TAXES
1162 (1950). I.R.C., §691 clearly does not apply. See comment, 1958 UNiv. !LI.. L. FoRUM
135 at 150.
so I.R.C., §lO0l(a).
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and the fair market value.31 Furthermore, if there were any gain
it would be taxed at capital gains rates. If the redemption is treated
as a dividend, the entire amount paid by the corporation for the
stock would be taxed at ordinary rates without regard to basis.82
When the stock of the corporation is owned by unrelated
parties, the redemption will most likely be treated as a sale or exchange. Section 302(b) provides that a redemption shall be treated
as a sale or exchange when the redemption is (1) "not essentially
equivalent to a dividend," 33 (2) "substantially disproportionate
with respect to the shareholder" whose stock is redeemed, 34 or
(3) a "termination of the shareholder's interest." 35 The last two are
objective standards which, if met, would guarantee sale or exchange treatment. In the ordinary stock purchase agreement the
deceased's interest in the corporation is completely terminated.
Thus the redemption would be treated as a sale or exchange under
section 302(b)(3) and the estate would not be liable for a heavy
tax on a dividend. Even if the estate's interest were not completely
terminated, it could qualify for sale or exchange treatment by
meeting the specified conditions under the "substantially disproportionate" corridor of section 302(b)(2). These conditions
are that after the redemption the shareholder must have less than
50 percent of the corporate voting power, and his proportionate
interest must be less than 80 percent of his proportionate interest
before redemption.
If the decedent's estate fails to meet either of the guaranteed
standards which permit sale or exchange treatment, the estate may
attempt to show that the redemption is "not essentially equivalent
to a dividend." This would be difficult to show because it is doubtful whether a court would hold that a shareholder who cannot
meet ·the two new objective standards established by Congress

81 I.R.C., §1014(a) provides that the estate's basis for the stock is the fair market
value at death, and Treas. Reg., §20.2031-2(d) (1944) provides that a valid stock redemption agreement will determine the fair market value of the stock if certain conditions
are met. See part I-B-5 infra.
82 If a redemption does not meet one of the tests in I.R.C., §302(b) then the "amount
distributed" as determined in §301 would be includible in income as a dividend to the
extent of the corporation's earnings and profits, as set out in §316(a). This assumes that
there is no question of partial liquidation (I.R.C., §346) or of "tainted" preferred stock
(I,R.C., §306).
33 I.R.C., §302(b)(l).
34 I.R.C., §302(b)(2).
811 I.R.C., §302(b)(3).
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can still qualify under the old subjective test.36 Actually this
question is of little concern where the stock is owned by unrelated
parties as most redemptions in such situations would qualify for
sale or exchange treatment under one of the two objective standards of section 302.
When the corporation is owned by related parties, however,
the constructive ownership rule presents a real danger. 37 In this
situation the question is whether or not, on the death of one of the
parties, the stock of one of the related survivors will be attributed
to the decedent's estate and thereby cause the estate to lose the
benefit of sale or exchange treatment. The constructive ownership
rules provide that certain taxpayers are to be treated as if they
owned the stock held by related taxpayers. Under section 318 an individual is treated as owning the stock of "his spouse, ... children,
grandchildren, and parents." 38 An estate is considered to own
stock held by each beneficiary and the beneficiary is considered
to own a proportionate part of the stock owned by the estate.39
Since "stock constructively owned by a person . . . shall . . . be
treated as actually owned by such person,"40 there can be a series
of stock attribution links so that the beneficiary of an estate may
not directly own any stock, but may through a parent, grandchild,
child, or spouse constructively own some stock which will then
in turn be attributed to the estate.41 This gives the constructive
ownership rules tremendous breadth which multiplies the risks
in this area. 42 There is one exception to the series of attribution
links-no one chain can include more than one link due to family
relationship.43 Thus stock owned by a son can be attributed to
his father but not through the father_ to the son's brother.44 Apply36 The only test for sale or exchange treatment before 1954 was "essentially equivalent
to a dividend."
37 I.R.C., §318. See generally Winton and Hoffman, "A Case Study of Stock Redemp•
tions under Sections 302 and 318 of the New Code," IO TAX L. REv. 363 (1955); Larkin,
"Stock Redemption: Sections 302 and 318," 14 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 671 (1956);
Hoffman, "1954 Code Can Turn Buy-Sell Agreements into Disastrous Tax Traps for
Stockholders," 4 J. TAXATION 322 (1956).
38 I.R.C., §318(a)(l).
39 There are similar rules applicable for trusts and their beneficiaries, partnerships
and partners, corporations and controlling shareholders. I.R.C., §318(a)(2).
40 I.R.C., §318(a)(4)(A).
41 Treas. Reg., §1.318-3, Ex. 2 (1955); Treas. Reg., §1.318·2 (1955).
42 Some of the problems are discussed in 9 J. TAXATION 266 (1958); Winton and
Hoffman, "A Case Study of Stock Redemptions under Sections 302 and 318 of the New
Code," 10 TAX L. REv. 363 (1955).
43 I.R.C., §318(a)(4)(B).
44 Treas. Reg., §1.318-4 (1955).
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ing these rules to a section 302 redemption where the beneficiaries
of the estate own directly or indirectly any stock in the corporation,
the danger of dividend instead of sale or exchange treatment
can immediately be perceived. Although all the stock an estate
directly owns may be redeemed, the objective standard of complete termination may not be met because of stock constructively
o-wned by the estate. If the estate constructively owns a large
number of shares, the other guaranteed standard of "substantially
disproportionate redemption" will likewise not be met. Of course
the estate may be able to satisfy the subjective test of "not essentially equivalent to a dividend," but this is particularly difficult
to prove under section 302 as it is now written.
The constructive mvnership rules can often be avoided by
astute planning. When the constructive ownership problem stems
from the situation where the beneficiary of any legacy in the estate
directly owns stock which would be attributed to the estate,
several schemes can be employed. First, the beneficiaries and the
estate could sell all of their stock at the same time to meet the
complete termination standard, or sell enough to meet the substantially disproportionate standard. Second, the estate can be so
planned that anyone directly or constructively owning stock in
the corporation would not be a beneficiary of the estate.45 These
solutions of course are somewhat limited because they would
be possible only when the non-tax aspects of the arrangement are
satisfactory to all the parties involved. A more general solution
would be to delay the redemption of the stock held by the estate
until distribution of the legacy to the stock-owning beneficiaries
has taken place. Since under the regulations46 a person is no longer
a beneficiary of an estate when the legacy to which he is entitled
has been distributed, the effect of delaying redemption would
be to avoid the constructive ownership rules. There may be a practical difficulty, however, when the legacy is in cash because the
principal source of cash in the estate is often the stock, and there
would thus be nothing with which to pay the legacy until after
the redemption. Even if the beneficiary could receive his legacy
45 Greater use should be made of inter vivos gifts. A revocable trust could accomplish
the same result as a will and the beneficiary of the trust would not be regarded as beneficiary of the estate. Other possible devices such as this could be used. For purposes of
section 318 a person with a contingent remainder interest following another's life estate
is not considered a beneficiary. Treas. Reg., §l.318-2(c) (1955).
46 Treas. Reg., §l.318-3(a) (1955). See Rev. Rul. 58-111, 1958 INT. REv. BUL. No. 12,
at 9.
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before the redemption, there is still a danger that the Commissioner at a later time may seek to invoke the "step-transaction"
doctrine. 47 Under this doctrine the two steps could be tied together
so that the stock of the beneficiary should still be attributed to
the estate.
If the problem is that the beneficiary of the estate owns no
stock himself, but constructively owns the stock of his family
which is attributed through him to the estate, then section 302(c)(2)
provides a solution.48 This section provides that if certain conditions are met the constructive ownership rules will not apply
when there is a complete termination of the directly owned
interests. These conditions are that the estate shall have no
further direct interest in the corporation,49 that no part of the
stock redeemed was acquired under prescribed conditions within
ten years of the redemption, and that no person owns stock
attributable to the distributee which was acquired under the
prescribed conditions within ten years. 5° For example, if a son
and father owned corporation Y and the mother was the beneficiary
of the father's estate, the constructive ownership rules, without
section 302(c)(2), would apply. Thus the son's stock would be
attributed through the mother to the estate, and thereby prevent
an attempt to meet the objective standard of complete termination. If the conditions of section 302(c)(2) are met, however, the
son's stock will not be attributed through the mother to the estate,
and complete termination would re~ult.
Several other methods of avoiding the constructive ownership
rules need to be considered. First, the constructive ownership
rules do not apply to a section 303 redemption.51 This section
provides that a corporation can in certain situations redeem stock
held by an estate to the extent of the estate tax, inheritance tax,
and administrative costs and such redemption will be treated as
a sale or exchange. The estate can thus at least partially avoid
47 American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. 397 (1948), affd. per curiam (3d Cir. 1949) 177
F. (2d) 513, cert. den. 339 U.S. 920 (1950); Mintz, "Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations," 12 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 247 (1954).
48 I.R.C., §302(c)(2).
49 I.R.C., §302(c)(2)(A)(i).
50 I.R.C., §302(c)(2)(A)(ii). There may be a danger because the estate acquired the
stock from the decedent within IO years but it is doubtful that these qualifications were
meant to include acquisition by operation of law.
51 I.R.C., §303. For a general discussiqn see Lanahan, "Redemptions To Pay Death
Taxes: Redemptions Through the Use of Related Corporations," 15 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED.
TAX. 493 (1957).
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dividend consequences on the redemption. Even here there is a
danger under the regulations52 that the amount paid for the shares
covering taxes and administrative costs might be treated as a
dividend. Finally, an attempt to qualify for sale or exchange
treatment under the subjective test of "not essentially equivalent
to a dividend" may prove worthwhile. The courts may use the
subjective test as a convenient means of mitigating the harsh
results of the constructive ownership rules. 63 The Commissioner
has recently shown a disposition to use this type analysis when
convinced there is no plan to avoid taxes. 64
2. Redemption Proceeds as Dividends to the Surviving Shareholders. It is possible that the proceeds paid to redeem stock of a
deceased shareholder will be taxed as a constructive dividend to
the surviving shareholders.65 Several recent cases, however, have
minimized this possibility by indicating that the surviving shareholder will not be deemed to have received a constructive dividend
unless he has received "a direct pecuniary benefit." The most
recent case supporting this view is Holsey v. Commissioner. 66 In
this case the Greenville Auto Sales Co. owned all the outstanding
shares of the Holsey Co. Joseph R. Holsey secured an option from
Greenville to purchase 50 percent of the shares and a further option to purchase, within IO years after the exercise of the first
option, the other 50 percent. Holsey exercised the first option and
several years later the second option was revised so that he or a
corporation in which he owned 50 percent of the common stock
could purchase the remaining shares. The option was then assigned to the Holsey Co. which redeemed the remaining shares.
The Tax Court felt that the redemption was for the personal hen-

li2 Treas. Reg., §1.303 (1955). For a possible although doubtful danger see Gelband,
"Tax Trap Hidden in Sec. 303; Careful Timing of Redemptions Necessary," 8 J. TAXATION 244 (1958).
liS There were no statutory constructive ownership rules under the 1939 code. Nonetheless, the courts did use the constructive ownership idea when they found that a
redemption was essentially equivalent to a dividend because of family ownership of
stock. Commissioner v. Roberts, (4th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 304. ·Even with the constructive
ownership idea, they found that certain redemptions were not essentially equivalent to
a dividend even though there was a family relationship. Ada Murphy McFarlane, 13
CCH T.C.M. 467 (1954).
li4 Rev. Rul. 56-183, 1956-1 CuM. BUL. 161; Rev. Rul. 56-556, 1956-2 CUM BUL. 177;
Rev. Rul. 56-584, 1956-2 CUM. BUL. 179.
lili Generally see Hobbet, "The New Attack on Stock Redemptions," 35 TAXES 830
(1957); Pavenstedt, "Use of Corporate Funds To Buy Out a Stockholder-The Schmitt
Case and Its Ramifications," 12 N.Y.U. !Nsr. ON FED. TAX. 203 (1954).
li6 (3d Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 865, revg. 28 T.C. 962 (1957).
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efit of Holsey since he was in the same position as if he had personally purchased the shares. The argument that the redemption was
for a corporate purpose because an adjustment in stock ownership was necessary to retain the corporation's automobile dealer
franchise was rejected by the court on the belief that a realignment of stock ownership is a shareholder purpose. The Third
Circuit reversed, one judge dissenting, 57 and ruled that "in the
absence of a direct pecuniary benefit to the taxpayer the Tax
Court erred in holding the distribution in question taxable to
him." 58 The personal benefit theory of the Tax Court was refuted
when the court said that even if there was an indirect benefit, it
had not yet been "realized" within the meaning of the Sixteenth
Amendment. 59 The court reasoned further that unless there was
a direct pecuniary benefit, the redemption could not be treated as
"essentially equivalent to a dividend" to the remaining shareholder, since there was a change in proportionate interest of the
shareholders wliich would not have been accomplished by an ordinary dividend. The situation that would involve "a direct pecuniary benefit" to the shareholder would be where he has a contractual
obligation to purchase the stock of another shareholder, and the
corporation in redeeming the stock releases this obligation.60
In the recent case of Zipp v. Commissioner61 the remaining
shareholders received 46 of the 48 shares of the departing shareholder and instead of paying for them had the corporation redeem the other two shares at a price equal in value to all 48 shares.
The payment for the two shares was considered a constructive dividend to the remaining shareholders. This case was cited in the
Holsey case as involving a "direct pecuniary benefit" to these
57 The dissent agreed with the Tax Court view. Holsey v. Commissioner, (3d Cir.
1958) 258 F. (2d) 865 at 869.
58 Id. at 868-869.
59 Realized in the sense of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). Also see Schmitt
v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1954) 208 F. (2d) 819. For a criticism of the need for realization,
see Sneed, "A Defense of the Tax Court's Result in Prunier and Casale," 43 CoRN. L.Q.
339 (1958). Cases consistent with this view are Ray Edenfield, 19 T.C. 13 (1952); Joseph
P. Schmitt, 20 T.C. 352 (1953), revd. (3d Cir. 1954) 208 F. (2d) 819; Fox v. Harrison,
(7th Cir. 1944) 145 F. (2d) 521; Earl F. Tucker, 23 T.C. 115 (1954), revd. (8th Cir. 1955)
226 F. (2d) 177. Cf. Zenz v. Quinlivan, (6th Cir. 1954) 213 F. (2d) 914.
60 Wall v. United States, (4th Cir. 1947) 164 F. (2d) 462 (where the corporation
assumed the obligation). Eli R. Lowenthal, 6 CCH T.C.M. 678 (1947), affd. (7th Cir.
1948) 169 F. (2d) 694; Frank P. Holloway, 10 CCH T.C.M. 1257 (1952), affd. per curiam
(6th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 566; Woodworth v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d)
719. For a good review of all the cases in this area, see Graham, "Redemption ProblemsThe Holsey and Zipp Cases," 36 TAXES 925 (1958).
6128 T.C. 314 (1957), affd. per curiam (6th Cir. 1958) 259 ,F. (2d) 119.
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shareholders. Yet neither the Tax Court nor the Sixth Circuit in
the Zipp case felt that the case involved any direct pecuniary benefit. It was instead felt that the remaining shareholders had caused
the redeeming corporation's "cash to be distributed for their benefit, i.e., to purchase all" of the departing shareholder's stock. 62
These cases should not endanger the normal stock purchase
agreement redemption. The test of the Holsey case would be
met as the surviving shareholders have received no direct pecuniary benefit. Even if they do receive an indirect benefit from the redemption, either because of increased control of the corporation
or because the remaining assets in the corporation are of greater
value than their proportionate share of the assets before redemption, such benefit has not yet been realized. 63 The Holsey case also
suggested that there could be no constructive dividend if the
proportionate interest of the surviving shareholder had changed,
and this is of course true in all stock purchase agreement
redemptions.64
If the benefit test suggested in the Zipp case is interpreted to
mean that there will be no constructive dividend to the survivor
if any corporate purpose is shown, then this test does not endanger
stock purchase agreement redemptions because of their inherent
benefit to the corporation.65 In light of a prior Sixth Circuit
opinion, this would seem to be the proper interpretation of the
Zipp case. 66 The language in the Zipp case might also be interpreted to mean that there will be a constructive dividend to the
surviving stockholder when the survivor primarily benefits from
the redemption, even though there is some corporate purpose. If
this interpretation is accepted, stock purchase agreement redemptions might meet with some difficulties. It can be argued, however, that these redemptions primarily benefit the corporation
62 Zipp v. Commissioner,
63 See note 59 supra.
64 If this test is used in

28 T.C. 314 at 329 (1957).

more cases, the government will have a difficult time at•
tacking stock purchase agreements. However, there is some doubt if it will be applied.
The test was originally used against shareholders who had their shares redeemed for
cash and also against shareholders receiving stock dividends. In those areas the question
was whether the proportionate interest of the shareholders had decreased and not as
here if they had increased. In those cases the shareholder actually received something
while here the remaining shareholder has received nothing. It is enough to say that most
of the cases in this area have not adopted the proportionate interest test but have instead
used a direct pecuniary benefit test. But see Ferro v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1957) 242 F.
(2d) 838.
65 Note 25 supra.
66 Ferro v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1957) 242 F. (2d) 838.
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rather than the shareholder. It might also be suggested that the
case was improperly decided and should not be followed when
considered in light of cases which hold that a shareholder may dispose of his stock by selling part to the corporation and part to another shareholder without constructive dividend treatment to the
other shareholder, 67 and cases which hold that a direct pecuniary
benefit is needed. 68 Another reason for not accepting the rationale
of the Zipp case is that the holding undermines the usefulness of
the redemption provision in section 302(b)(3),69 which guarantees
sale or exchange treatment to shareholders who completely terminate their interest through a redemption. Few shareholders would
make use of this redemption provision if it would result in a constructive dividend to the remaining shareholders.
The Internal Revenue Service recently indicated that it did
not intend to extend the constructive dividend reasoning to ordinary stock purchase agreements,70 and it thus seems safe to assume
that the redemption of a deceased shareholder's stock will not be
treated as a constructive dividend to the surviving shareholder.
3. Basis of the Stock Following Redemption. If the redemption
of the deceased shareholder's stock pursuant to the stock purchase
agreement does not result in a constructive dividend to the surviving shareholder, it naturally follows that the basis of the surviving shareholder's stock will remain the same as before the redemption.71 On the other hand, if the surviving shareholder is
deemed to have received a constructive dividend when the deceased shareholder's stock was redeemed, he should perhaps receive a basis for his stock equal to the redemption price of the
decedent's stock plus the basis of his stock before redemption. The
reason for this result would be that since he is treated as if he had
received a dividend and had bought the decedent's shares, he
should receive the advantage of the "stepped-up" basis.
The corporation has no basis for the stock even if the redemption is treated as a sale or exchange and not as a constructive dividend to the decedent's estate.72 This result is now dictated by
67 Ray

Edenfield, 19 T.C. 73 (1952); Zenz v. Quinlivan, (6th Cir. 1954) 213 F. (2d) 914.
60 supra.
69 I.R.C., §302(b)(3).
10 Comment, 9 J. TAXATION 221 (1958). T.I.R. 109, 58-6 CCH STAND. FED. TAX. REP.
1(6780 (1958).
71 I.R.C., §1012 provides for a cost basis.
72 The corporation should have no basis for the redeemed stock when the surviving
shareholder received constructive dividend treatment because the distribution then is
68 Note
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section 1032(a),73 which provides that a future sale of redeemed
stock will result in no gain or loss to the corporation.74 Thus it
would be impossible to argue that the corporation after this redemption has any basis for the stock. In addition, good accounting
principles provide that "any form of shares available for issue
represents merely a means of raising capital, not actual, realized
property. " 75
4. Insurance Proceeds Received by the Corporation. The question whether the proceeds from a life insurance policy used to
finance a stock purchase agreement are includible in the corporation's gross income for income tax purposes is answered by section
IOI(a)(l). 76 That provision states that "gross income does not include amounts received ... under a life insurance contract, if such
amounts are paid by reason of the death of the insured." This
would apply to the ordinary stock purchase agreement where the
corporation was purchaser, beneficiary, and owner of the insurance. 77 The only time that gain must be recognized on receipt of
insurance proceeds is under section 10l(a)(2),78 when the policy has
been transferred for a valuable consideration. However, even if an
insurance policy is transferred to a corporation for valuable consideration, the gain from the proceeds is not subject to the income
tax under a special exception to the "transfer for value" rule in
section 10l(a)(2)(B),79 which provides that a transfer "to a corporation in which the insured is a shareholder or officer" will not
cause the insurance proceeds to be subject to the income tax.
The proceeds of the insurance policy may cause an estate tax
problem. If the decedent is beneficiary or has any of the incidents
not a sale or exchange but simply a dividend and a subsequent purchase between the
shareholders.
73 I.R.C., §1032(a).
74 This was not always

the rule. Before 1954 the basis of redeemed stock was recognized so that, in certain transactions, gain or loss would be recognized. Reg. 77, Art. 66
of the 1932 act provided that "if a corporation deals in its own shares as it might in the
shares of another corporation, the resulting gain or loss is to be computed in the same
manner as though the corporation were dealing in the shares of another." See Helvering
v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 45 B.T.A. 472 (1941), revd. (8th Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 575,
cert. den. 319 U.S. 752 (1943). But see Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S.
no (1939).
75 PATON, EssENTIALS OF ACCOUNTING 713 (1949).
76 I.R.C., §IOI(a)(l). See generally RABKIN AND JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME GIFT AND
EsTATE TAXATION §61.03 (1956).
77 The section is even broader than this as it is doubtful if the proceeds would be
includible even if the corporation was not owner of the policy.
78 I.R.C., §IOI(a)(2).
79 I.R.C., §IOI(a)(2)(B).
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of ownership in the policy,80 there is a possibility that both the insurance proceeds and the value of the decedent's interest in the
corporation will be included in the decedent's gross estate. 81 A
proposed regulation provided that in cases where the shareholder
retains any incidents of ownership, his estate would not include
both the insurance proceeds and the decedent's interest in the
corporation if the stock purchase agreement were made in good
faith. However, if the agreement were made in bad faith, "both the
value of the decedent's interest or shares (determined without regard to the agreement) and if otherwise includible, the proceeds
of the insurance (except to the extent that the proceeds are included in the value of the interest or shares)" 82 would be included
in the decedent's gross estate. Although this treatment has been
omitted from the final regulation, 83 this type of reasoning might be
used by the government when the decedent instead of the corporation has the incidents of ownership in the life insurance policies
used to finance the stock purchase agreement.
When the estate is beneficiary of the insurance both the proposed and final regulations are silent, si and the government may
argue for full inclusion of both the stock and the insurance. There
are cases which hold that only the larger amount will be included in the decedent's estate. 85 All the above estate tax problems
concerning the insurance proceeds can be easily avoided by making the corporation beneficiary and owner of the policies.
5. Valuation of Decedent's Stock for Estate Tax Purposes.
Section 203l(a) 86 provides that "The value of the gross estate of
the decedent shall be determined by including ... the value at the
time of his death of all property." 87 Thus the value of a decedent's
stock in the corporation will be included in his estate.88 Only the
so This, of course, would not fall within the category of "conventional" agreements,
note 5 supra. If the insurance is purchased properly so that the corporation is owner
and beneficiary of the policy, this problem should not arise.
81 Insurance is generally included in a decedent's gross estate when the decedent
retains any incidents of ownership. I.R.C., §2042.
82 Proposed Treas. Reg., §20.2042-(l)(c)(6), 21 Fed. Reg. 7885 (1956).
83 Treas. Reg., §20.2042-I(c) (1958).
84 Treas. Reg., §20.2042-l(b) (1958).
85 Estate of John T. H. -Mitchell, 37 B.T.A. 1 (1938); M. W. Dobrzensky, 34 B.T.A.
305 (1936).
86 I.R.C., §2031(a).
87 Value means fair market value. Treas. Reg., §20.2031-l(b) (1958).
88 There is also a problem of inheritance tax which should be analyzed. Other than
inheritance ta.x, local law can cause some real problems if the agreement is not binding.
See Matter of Galewitz, 3 App. Div. (2d) 280, 160 N.Y.S. (2d) 564 (1957).
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question whether the agreement is determinative of the value for
estate tax purposes89 will here be considered. An estate tax value
established in this way is desirable in that it avoids the threat of
the estate being taxed on a 'high valuation while being bound to
sell at a lower price.00 Equation of the value under the stock
purchase agreement with the estate tax value also avoids future
litigation and makes possible a precise calculation of the estate tax
which will aid business planning. The regulations91 and the courts
are not clear as to the efficacy of a stock purchase agreement in
controlling the estate tax valuation, 92 although certain minimum
requirements may be set down which, if followed, should result
in the agreement being given binding effect.93 First; the agreement
must be "a bona fide business arrangement," 94 which is determined
by the factors of family relationship, full and adequate consideration, and methods of evaluating the corporation. The purpose of
this requirement is to prevent the parties, by setting a low price
on the corporation, from effectuating a donative or testamentary
intent without the payment of a gift or estate tax. When the deceased stockholder's relatives own the remaining shares of stock in
the corporation, the agreement will be scrutinized closely for this
testamentary or donative intent.95 Although "a bona fide business

89 For methods of valuing a small corporation, see Treas. Reg., §20.2031-3, Rev.
Rul. 54-77, 1954-1 CuM. BUL. 187; Rockefeller, "Valuation of Closely Held Stocks for
Estate and Gift Tax Purposes," 36 TAXES 259 (1958); LOWNDES AND KRAMER, FEDERAL
EsrATE AND GIFT TAXES 488-499 (1956). For the binding effect of an agreement on estate
tax value, see comment, 41 MARQ. L. REv. 48 (1957); Ness, "Federal Estate Tax Consequences of Agreements and Options To Purchase Stock on Death," 49 CoL. L. REv.
796 (1949); Pavenstedt, "The Second Circuit Reaffirms Efficacy of Restrictive Stock Agreements To Control Estate Tax Valuation," 51 MICH. L. REv. I (1952); Bowe, "Options
and Valuation of Property for Tax Purposes," 2 VAND. L. REv. 427 (1949). For cases
involving the binding effect of a stock purchase agreement on gift tax liability, see
Commissioner v. Mccann, (2d Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 385; Raymond J. Moore, 3 T.C.
1205 (1944).
90 Of course if there are two truly adverse parties, the agreement price should almost
equal the market value. In the case of related parties, there may be considerable difference
between agreement price and market value.
91 The regulation says that the stock purchase agreement is only one factor in
determining the estate tax value. Treas. Reg., §20.2031-2(h) (1958).
92 The Supreme Court, in an income tax case, has recognized that such agreement
could put a ceiling on the valuation of restricted property. Helvering v. Salvage, 297
U.S. 106 (1936).
93 A stock purchase agreement should be given effect even if ·below the fair market
value because value is at best a guess and thus the parties' guess, if made in good faith,
should govern. Also a restriction on stock may itself diminish its value.
94 Treas. Reg., §20.2031-2(h) (1958).
95 Edith M. Bense!, 36 B.T.A. 246 (1937), affd. (3d Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 639; Rev.
Rul. 54-77, 1954-1 CuM. BUL. 187.
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arrangement" is difficult to prove when related parties own the
rest of the corporate stock, it can still be shown if the two objective
factors of adequate consideration and fair evaluation of the corporation are clearly shown.96 The type of consideration required by
the regulations is "money or money's worth." 97 Mutual promises, if
equivalent to "money's worth," may provide the necessary consideration.98 This equivalence is easily shown when the shareholders
have equal interests and life expectancies, or when the agreement
is made with a minority shareholder in order to keep him in the
business. The most important factor in determining if the agreement is "bona fide" is the method of valuing the corporation.99
The price must fairly reflect the value of the corporation when the
agreement is executed.100 Thus a disparity between the agreement
value and market value at the date of death should be insignificant.101 However, a great disparity may show lack of good faith
at the date of execution, and for this reason a clause providing for
periodic re-evaluation should be inserted. This is especially true
if related parties are involved. A problem considered by the proposed regulations was whether the contemplated insurance proceeds should be considered in the original valuation,102 but this
was solved in the negative by the final regulations.103 Second,104
there should also be a restriction on the right of the owner to transfer his stock during life.105 To be safe there should be an absolute
provision against any transfers during life even though a right of
96 Brodrick v. Gore, (10th Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 892; Rose Wasserman, 24 T.C. 1141
(1955), dismissed ,by stipulation on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
May v. McGowan, (W.D. N.Y. 1950) 97 F. Supp. 326, affd. (2d Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 396.
An attempt to show that the agreement was a transfer in contemplation of or to take
effect on death was rejected. Estate of Lionel Weil, 22 T.C. 1267 (1954) (acq.).
97 The adequacy of consideration is measured at the date of execution of the
agreement.
98 Murphy v. Murphy, 217 Mass. 233, 104 N.E. 466 (1914); Matter of Fieux' Estate,
241 N.Y. 277, 149 N.'E. 857 (1925); McKinnon v. McKinnon, (8th Cir. 1893) 56 F. 409.
99 Note 89 supra.
100 Edith M. Bense!, 36 B.T.A. 246 (1937), affd. (3d Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 139.
101 Estate of John Q. Strange, P-H T.C.M. 1[42247 (1942).
102 Proposed Treas. Reg., §20.2042-l(c)(6), 21 Fed. Reg. 7885 (1956).
.
10s Proposed Treas. Reg., §20.2042-l(c)(6) was dropped in the final regulations.
Treas. Reg., §20.2042 (1958). See comment, 9 J. TAXATION 302 (1958).
104 This can be considered a separate qualification or it can be argued that it is
just another factor to be used to see if the agreement is bona fide.
105 Estate of James H. Matthews, 3 T.C. 525 (1944) (acq.); Baltimore National Bank
v. United States, (D.C. Md. 1955) 136 F. Supp. 642; Treas. Reg., §20.2031-2(h) f'Little
weight will be accorded a price contained in an option or contract under which the
decedent is free to dispose of the underlying securities at any price he chooses during
his life time.'1-
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first refusal in the corporation plus a price fixing provision has
been upheld as a sufficient restriction. 106 The reason for this requirement is that if the decedent could dispose of his interest prior
to death his failure to dispose would be in effect a transfer to the
corporation and its remaining shareholders of the difference between the market value before his death and the price set by the
stock purchase agreement. 107 The final requirement108 is that the
agreement should bind the corporation to buy and the estate to
sell the interest of the deceased. 109 The rationale behind this requirement is that if the estate would be bound not by the price in
the agreement, then the price should be the fair market value at
date of death. An agreement has been held binding for valuation
purposes even when the estate was bound to sell and the corporation had an option to buy. 110 An option on the part of the estate to
sell is probably not binding, although it might suitably serve as a
minimum value. An option of first offer completely fails to meet
the requirement of a binding agreement. 111 If the proper precautions are taken at the planning stage, the value set by the stock
purchase agreement should be determinative of the stock value for
estate tax purposes.

C. Operation of the Agteement After the Death
of One of the Parties
I. Insurance Policy on the Life of the Survivor. What happens
to the life insurance policies held on the surviving shareholder is
not a significant problem in a stock purchase agreement.112 The
survivor could purchase the insurance on his life from the corporation. If this were done, the difference between the amount paid
and the proceeds of the insurance on the survivor's death would
not be subject to the income tax. Ordinarily a "transfer of value"
would cause this difference to be taxed under section 10l(a)(2),113
106 Brodrick v. Gore, (10th Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 892; Estate of Albert L. Salt, 17
T.C. 92 (1951) (acq.).
101 This can be analogized to either a transfer with a reservation of a life estate or a
revocable transfer. I.R.C., §§2036, 2038.
10s Note I 04 supra.
109 Rose Newman, 31 B.T.A. 772 (1934): John T. H. Mitchell, 37 B.T.A. l (1938).
110 Wilson v. Bowers, (S.D. N.Y. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 261, affd. (2d Cir. 1932) 57 F. (2d)
682; May v. McGowan, (W.D. N.Y. 1950) 97 F. Supp. 326, affd. (2d Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d)
396.
111 Estate of Ambrose Fry, 9 T.C. 503 (1947).
112 See part II supra.
118 Generally a transfer for value will be treated the same as an investment in stock
and thus the appreciation in value would be taxed. I.R.C., §10l(a)(2).
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but an exception to the ordinary "transfer for value" rule was
provided in section I0I(a)(2)(B) when the transfer for value is to
the insured. 114 On the other hand, the insurance can be retained
by the corporation as "key man" insurance,115 or to finance another
stock purchase agreement, and the _proceeds from the insurance
will not be subject to any income tax. 116

II.

CROSS PURCHASE AGREEMENTS COMPARED WITH STOCK
REDEMPTION AGREEMENTS

If a cross purchase agreement, where the surviving shareholder
is to buy up the deceased shareholder's interest, is used instead of
a stock purchase agreement, greater tax safety can often be obtained.117 Some of the non-tax disadvantages of a cross purchase
agreement should be noted, however, before the tax aspects are
discussed.U 8 First, if there are more than two shareholders involved, a cross purchase agreement is cumbersome.119 Each shareholder must purchase insurance on the lives of each of the other
shareholders.120 There will be confusion when one of the parties
to the agreement dies, because in order to continue the agreement
all of the policies owned by the deceased on the surviving shareholders will have to be purchased by the survivors. 121 This problem might be solved by originally putting all the insurance in
trust and having the agreement administered by a trustee. These
problems do not arise in a stock purchase agreement, which is administered through the corporation. Secondly, there is the risk

114 I.R.C.,
115 Clapp,

§I0I(a)(2)(B).
"Deduction of Premiums and Interest Paid To Carry Insurance; Taxation
of Annuities; Keyman Insurance," 9 N.Y.U. INST. oN FED. TAX. 21 at 35 (1951).
116 I.R.C., §IOl(a)(I).
117 A cross purchase agreement is where the shareholder instead of the corporation
agrees to buy the decedent's stock. If insurance is used, each shareholder should purchase
insurance on the life of the other. If this is not done, serious tax consequences can result.
118 Generally see Krogue, "Funding Stock Purchase Plan with Life Insurance,"
ESTATE PLANNERS Q. 34 (March 1958); Redeker, "Business Insurance Agreements-Entity
Purchase versus Cross Purchase,'' 12 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 675 (1954).
119 The same thing is true if it is contemplated that additional shareholders will
join the agreement at a later time.
120 This could result in 30 policies when 6 shareholders are involved as each shareholder owns the insurance on every other shareholder's life.
121 The agreement could be continued without the purchase of these policies from
the decedent's estate ,by the purchase of new policies or cash financing but new policies
may be unavailable because one of the survivors is uninsurable and the parties generally
will not have enough free cash. Ordinarily additional funding is needed to cover the
additional interest that each shareholder purchased from the decedent.
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that an individual shareholder may fail to make the premium payment. Although this risk is present in the case of a corporation,
there is less chance of its occurrence when the corporation is responsible for the premiums.122 Despite these disadvantages, a cross
purchase agreement may from a non-tax viewpoint be preferable to
a stock purchase agreement because of certain stringent restrictions placed on corporations by local law. 123
If the shareholders are satisfied with the non-tax aspects of a
cross purchase agreement, the tax features should make the cross
purchase agreement even more desirable. It has been argued that
since the shareholders pay the insurance premiums in a cross
purchase agreement, the corporation would have to pay a large
enough dividend so that the amount remaining in the hands of
the shareholders after taxes would cover the premium payments.
What this argument overlooks is that the distribution for the premium payments may not be considered a dividend when the stockholders are also employees, but rather additional compensation
and therefore deductible by the corporation.124 If this is true, the
value of the deduction to the corporation may more than offset
the added tax to the shareholder,125 and thus the cross purchase
form could actually save taxes on the premium payments.126
122 The reason for this is that both shareholders are continually in touch with the
corporate affairs and they can be sure that the premiums are paid and that the corporation
is financially able to redeem. It is also argued by some that there is a psychological
difference when a corporation handles the agreement. Redeker, "Business Insurance
Agreements-Entity Purchase versus Cross Purchase," 12 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx. 675
(1954).
12s For problems of local law, see note 8 supra. There is an additional non-tax factor
of inequity on premium payments. It can arise in a cross purchase agreement when both
shareholders own the corporation equally but the younger shareholder must pay the
greater premium. It can be argued that this is not inequitable ,because it is likely that
he will have less payments to make before the older shareholder dies. Another inequity
in the cross purchase is when the minority shareholder has to pay a large premium to
cover the majority shareholder's interest but this can be refuted as the minority shareholder gets greater value when he ,buys out the majority. The argument of inequity in
a stock purchase agreement is when there is a difference in interests and the majority
shareholder will be bearing the larger part of the premium payment so the minority
shareholder can buy him out. Davis, "Business Purchase Agreements," 94 TRUSTS AND
EsrATES 284 (1955).
124 I.R.C., §162. See Casper Ranger Construction Co., I B.T.A. 942 (1925).
125 BOWE, EsrATE PLANNING AND TAXATION, Stud. ed., §16.22 (1957).
126 The savings for each case would have to be calculated but it can be generally
stated that if the shareholder's marginal rate is less than the corporation's rate, there
will be some tax savings. If the distribution is treated as a dividend, there would be no
savings and the stock purchase agreement might be cheaper. On the other hand a stock
purchase agreement always presents the danger that the premium payment will be
treated as a constructive dividend. See part I-A-1 supra.
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A cross purchase agreement is highly advantageous because
there are no problems involving the accumulated earnings tax
of section 531,127 the constructive ownership rule of section
318,128 or a constructive dividend to the surviving shareholder
at the time of the "buy-out."129 These problems do not arise because the corporation is in no way connected with the agreement.
When the basis of the survivor's stock in the cross purchase
method is compared with the basis of the survivor's stock in the
stock purchase method, the most important advantage of the cross
purchase method is revealed. The basis of the survivor's stock, if
a cross purchase agreement is used, is equal to the cost of his
original stock plus the cost of the stock purchased from the decedent.130 Under the stock purchase agreement the basis of the
survivor's stock is only the cost of his original stock. His basis is
not increased by the value of the decedent's stock,131 because the
corporation rather than the survivor purchased the decedent's
stock.132
Estate and income tax problems in relation to the insurance
proceeds on death of one of the parties are the same in both agreements. The discussion in the stock redemption area on this subject
is fully applicable to a cross purchase agreement.133 The final comparison between the two agreements deals with what hap.pens to
127 I.R.C., §531. See part
128 I.R.C., §318. See part
120 See part I-B-2 supra.
130 I.R.C., §1012.
131 See part I-B-3 supra.

I-A-3 supra.
I-B-1 supra.

1s2 It -can be argued that the basis difference is justified because of the difference in
value of the corporations. Thus in a cross purchase agreement the survivor receives an
increased basis because the value of the corporation remains the same while his interest
increases. In a stock purchase agreement, the survivor's basis remains the same even
though his interest increases because the value of the corporation has decreased. The
fallacy in this reasoning is that during the life of cross purchase agreements part of the
assets were paid out of the corporation to finance the agreement (at least enough to
cover insurance premiums) while in a stock purchase agreement no assets are removed
from the corporation. As a result of this, at the death of one of the parties the value of
the corporation should be about the same under either agreement. Thus, the difference
in basis is unjustified. Another possible argument to justify the basis difference is that
the funds used by the survivor to purchase the decedent's stock in a cross purchase agreement were distributed from the corporation but were taxed to the survivor, and thus his
basis should be increased. The funds used by the corporation to purchase the decedent's
stock in a stock purchase agreement were distributed by the corporation but were never
taxed to the survivor and thus his basis should remain the same. The fallacy here is
that the survivor in the cross purchase agreement may have been receiving the payments
as additional compensation and thus only paying one tax (individual) while the survivor
under the stock purchase agreement was also paying one tax (corporation).
133 I.R.C., §IOl(a). See part I-B-4 supra.
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the insurance on the life of the survivors after the death of one of
the parties. The insurance on the life of the survivors in a stock
purchase agreement is owned by the corporation and, as was
shown above, 134 no tax problems are presented. In a cross purchase
agreement the insurance on the life of the survivors is in the
decedent's estate,135 which can cause a serious problem. The
problem stems from the odd drafting in section 10l(a)(2)(B),136
and can best be shown by first analyzing section 10l(a)(2).137 This
provision states that when life insurance is transferred for value,
the proceeds on the death of the insured in excess of the cost will
be subject to the income tax in the hands of the transferee. 138 Section 10l(a)(2)(B) provides an exception to 10l(a)(2) when the
transfer for value is "to the insured, to a partner of the insured,
to a partnership in which the insured is a partner, or to a corporation in which the insured is a shareholder or officer." However,
for some unknown reason the provision fails to provide an exception for a transfer for value to fellow shareholders of the insured.139 Thus, if the survivors in a cross purchase agreement
wished to continue the agreement by purchasing the insurance on
the life of the other survivors from the decedent's estate,140 they
would eventually be subject under section IOI(a)(2) to an income
tax liability on the proceeds of the insurance. 0 f course if there
were only one survivor who purchased the insurance on his own
life from the decedent's estate, there would be no income tax
liability on the proceeds under section 10l(a)(2) because section
IOl(a)(2)(B) clearly excepts transfers for value to the insured.
In the case of corporations with only two shareholders, the
cross purchase agreement would be both the safer and cheaper
form of "buy and sell" agreement. Since there is no problem of
constructive ownership in the cross purchase arrangement,141 it
would also be the safer form for related parties.
134 See part I·C supra.
185 Since in a cross purchase

agreement the decedent owned insurance on the life
of the other shareholders, his estate would have to include the value of these insurance
policies. I.R.C., §203l(a).
186 I.R.C., §10l(a)(2)(B).
187 I.R.C., §10l(a)(2).
188 See note 113 supra.
139 The American Bar Association has requested that this provision be modified.
H. Hearing before Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 8381 (Technical Amendments
Act of 1958), 85th Cong., 2d sess., p. 2832 (1958).
140 Note 121 supra.
141 Constructive ownership applies when a corporation is redeeming and not when
shareholders are purchasing. See part I-B-1 supra.
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CONCLUSION

A general consideration of what the law should be may contribute to a fuller understanding of the problems involved when
dealing with a stock purchase agreement. The basic problem in
these agreements stems from the imposition of a corporate tax
which in the case of a closely-held corporation is highly artificial.
As a result of this distinction between corporation and individual,
taxpayers are constantly attempting to avoid the tax on one entity or the other without regard for the business or personal nature
of the transaction.
Congress has quite properly acted to prevent avoidance
schemes. 142 Section 531 143 was designed to prevent a corporation
from accumulating earnings without a corporate purpose in order
to avoid an ordinary income tax on its shareholders and then, at
some future time, have the shareholders either liquidate or sell
their interests in the corporation at capital gains benefits. When
this section is invoked by the government against a stock purchase
agreement, there is a conflict of policies. On the one hand the
agreement accomplishes just what the statute attempts to prevent
and should perhaps be subject to the penalty tax. However, it can
be argued that the underlying policy behind the use of stock
purchase agreements in general, to preserve small businesses,144
outweighs the policy of section 531. Further congressional action
can be found in section 318 which has the effect of making a
redemption involving related parties tax.able as a dividend because
of the avoidance possibilities. This provision is undoubtedly too
inclusive and should be modified.145
142 There are several statutory provisions which modify the strict separate entity
treatment, such as I.R.C., §§267(b)(2), 341, 541, 1371.
143 I.R.C., §531.
144 The recent hearings on the Technical Amendments Act showed innumerable
instances where men had either merged their corporations or were thinking of merging
them because of the serious tax consequences on death. H. Hearings before Committee
on Ways and Means on H.R. 8381 (Technical Amendments Act of 1958), 85th Cong., 2d
sess. (1958). Also see Brown, "How the Premium Payment Test Affects Small Business,"
36 TAXES 295 (1958). The importance of this merger argument has been somewhat minimized by I.R.C., §6166 which allows the estate tax of "small business estates" to be paid
over a IO-year period. The agreement also aids small business by the benefits provided
during the existence of the Agreement. Note 25 supra.
145 The recent hearings on the Technical Amendments Act uncovered a great deal
of dissatisfaction with this provision. H. Hearings on H.R. 8381 (Technical Amendments
Act of 1958), 85th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 2920, 2980, 3176 (1958). Also see comment, 9 J.
TAXATION 266 (1958). See Ringel, Surrey and Warren, "Attribution of Stock Ownership
in the Internal Revenue Code," 72 HARv. L. REv. 209 (1958).
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The government has, through litigation, also attempted to
prevent tax avoidance schemes. These attempts have come in a
series of cases involving constructive dividends where taxpayers
have used the corporate entity in an effort to minimize taxes. In
Holsey v. Commissioner,146 the taxpayer wished to purchase the
shares of the remaining shareholder and, having insufficient funds
or perhaps not wishing to spend after-tax dollars,147 he had the
corporation purchase the shares. No constructive dividend was
found. In Zipp v. Commissioner,148 a similar situation was presented except that neither the taxpayer nor the corporation had
adequate funds to purchase the remaining shares. The corporation
used borrowed funds which could be paid back with before-tax
dollars, and redeemed the shares. A constructive dividend to the
remaining shareholders was held to have been received. In Prunier
v. Commissioner,149 the principal shareholder was the owner
and beneficiary of an insurance policy used to fund a stock purchase agreement, while the corporation paid the premiums. It
was held that the payments did not constitute constructive dividends. It must be admitted that the factual situations here discussed, although related to the constructive dividend problems presented in the ordinary stock purchase agreement, represent extreme avoidance situations. It is doubtful if the government would
extend its attack to a properly drawn stock purchase agreement. 11,o
Even if the government seeks to extend its theory to cases involving a properly drawn stock purchase agreement, the theory
should be disputed. The government's argument is generally that
the individual shareholder benefits from the transaction and
should be taxed on the benefit received. 151 The difficulty with this
rationale is that anything which benefits the corporation will

146 28 T.C. 962 (1957), revd. (3d
147 This has reference to income

Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 865.
which was taxed to the corporation and distributed
to the shareholders where it was again taxed. If the corporation does the purchasing, tht>
income would only be taxed at the corporate level.
14828 T.C. 314 (1957), affd. per curiam (6th Cir. 1958) 259 F. (2d) 119.
149 28 T.C. 19 (1957), revd. (1st Cir. 1957) 248 F. (2d) 818.
150 See part I-A-1, I-B-2 supra. See note 147 supra. However, it must 1be recognized
that in a father-son corporation the benefits of a stock purchase agreement are not so
clear. The son would receive the corporation's stock through his father's estate even
without an agreement and thus the continuity of ownership argument for a stock purchase
agreement is quite weak.
151 See Henry E. Prunier, 28 T.C. 19 (1957); Sanders v. Fox, (D.C. Utah 1957) 149
F. Supp. 942; Joseph R. Holsey, 28 T.C. 962 (1957). See -the discussion of the government's
brief in Lawthers, "Prunier Reversed: No Income to Stockholders from Premiums Paid
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at least in some degree benefit its shareholders,152 especially in
a closed corporation. The use of this benefit theory places the
separate entity distinction in a confusing and indefinite position
which has caused a great deal of dissatisfaction. 153
The proper theory which should be applied to the separate entity problem has been suggested by a number of recent cases.154
Since Congress has recognized separate entities, with modifications,
the government and the courts should do likewise. The only deviation from this full recognition should be when the transaction
itself has absolutely no business purpose.155 Should avoidance increase, the problem would be squarely presented to Congress
either to modify or repeal the separate entity treatment.156 If
avoidance does not increase, it is hoped that the law will begin to
take a more definite and reassuring shape, which will lend itself to
proper business planning.
Joel D. Tauber, S.Ed.

by Corporation," 8 J. TAXATION 12 (1958); Lawthers, "IRS Continuing Attack on Insured
Redemptions Despite Court Setbacks; Sanders Reversed," 8 J. TAXATION 322 (1958).
152 For a discussion of the different "purposes" of a shareholder, see Sneed, "A
Defense of the Tax Court's Result in Prunier and Casale," 43 CoRN. L. Q. 339 (1958).
158 Rabkin, "The Close Corporation-Through the Looking Glass," 8 N.Y.U. INsr.
oN FED. TAX. 664 (1950); Jones and Gleason, "Casale Reversed: Corporate Insurance Not
Dividend to Controlling Stockholder," 7 J. TAXATION 258 (1957); comment, 71 HARV.
L. REv. 687 (1958).
154 See Sanders v. Fox, (10th Cir. 1958) 253 F. (2d) 855; Casale v. Commissioner,
(2d Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 440; Holsey v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 865.
155 This test does not concern the benefit to the shareholder but only the benefit
to the corporation. For this test the substance and not the form of the transaction should
be closely scrutinized. An excellent example of this is a case where a shareholder was
owner and beneficiary of a policy and the only connection the corporation had with the
policy was that it paid the premium; the court still felt there was no constructive
dividend. Lewis v. O'Malley, (8th Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 735. If substance is to prevail,
whether or not the insurance is mentioned in the agreement should be unimportant.
Some courts have attempted to make this distinction. Sanders v. Fox, (10th Cir. 1958)
253 F. (2d) 855, held that since the insurance was to :be used to purchase the stock as
required in the agreement, the premium payments were not constructive dividends to
the shareholder, On the other hand, Casale v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d)
440, stated that since the insurance was separate from the agreement, it would be subject
to corporate creditors and therefore the premiums were not constructive dividends to the
shareholders. This "no corporate benefit" test would not apply when a constructive
dividend is invoked against a surviving shareholder. In this type of case there should
be no dividend treatment unless there is a direct pecuniary benefit even though there
is no corporate purpose. The reason for this liberal view is that a tax. against the surviving
shareholder undermines the realization doctrine and deprives §302(b)(2) of its effectiveness.
15G To the extent that new sub-chapter S, of the Internal Revenue Code, which
permits electing "small business corporations" to avoid the corporate tax, is applicable,
Congress has made some strides in this direction.

